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MONEY TALKS: SEARCHING FOR
JUSTICE THROUGH COMPENSATION FOR
PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH
Deborah R. Hensler*
"There's no value, there's no value for Gricelda. If gold is the best
we have in this world, she was gold. If there's something better than
gold, she was that too."
Michael James, whose wife Gricelda died in the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001'
INTRODUCTION
It's a familiar scenario. The victims of a defective product, medical
malpractice, or catastrophic accident, or their surviving relatives,
stand before the television cameras explaining why they have decided
to sue. It's not the money, they say. Money cannot compensate us for
our lost health, our emotional distress, our fears about what the future
may hold in store. Money cannot bring back our loved ones. But we
need to understand why this happened. We need to find out who was
responsible. We need to make sure this never happens again.2 Some
viewers may nod sympathetically: surely many of the victims need
whatever money they can obtain from a lawsuit to pay medical bills,
cover wage losses, provide for the health and education of children
who have lost a parent. Other viewers may have a more cynical reac-
tion: here is yet another group of greedy litigants, looking for some-
one to blame for life's misfortunes, seeking to take a turn at the "tort
lottery.'3
* Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School. Thanks to
Julie McGuire, Jacqueline Curnutte, Erin Archerd, and Chien-Ying Yu for excellent research
assistance.
1. Elizabeth Mehrin & Geraldine Baum, Putting a Price on September Jlth's Human Loss,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92 (Belkin
quotes a coal miner's widow who filed suit against Jim Walter Resources after her husband was
killed in an accident in a mine owned by the company: "It's not about the money... I don't want
this to happen to anyone else's husband. I want the company to make things safer. But the
money is the only thing you are allowed to sue for.") Id.
3. Litigation critics have popularized the idea that tort litigation is a form of lottery. See, e.g.,
PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 200, 202 (1988);
Eric Peters, Captious Spin on the Wheel of Misfortune, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A17.
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What happens next is often a mystery. Some lawsuits are dropped
and, of those that proceed, most settle 4-often with an agreement that
the dollar amount of settlement will not be disclosed.5 But, in rare
instances, the victims may appear again before the cameras after a
jury has awarded them tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. We
have been vindicated, they say. The jury has sent a message. The
money is not important. It cannot bring back our health. It cannot re-
store our loved ones to us.
What are we to make of these scenes? Quite obviously the money
is important. If no money were to be had, it would be foolish for
victims to sue and impossible in most instances for them to find law-
yers to represent them. Indeed, many tort litigation disputes turn less
on the question of liability-whether the defendant did something
wrongful-than on the question of damages-how much money plain-
tiffs should get.6 Are victims simply putting the best face on their self-
interested pursuit of monetary compensation? Or does the money
awarded by juries or paid in settlement by defendants have a meaning
to victims beyond its value in the marketplace? What is the relation-
ship between money and justice for tort claimants?
The terrible events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent at-
tempts to compensate and care for those who lost loved ones in the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, provide an op-
portunity to explore how Americans think about the relationships
among loss, compensation, and justice. The outpouring of charitable
contributions, the establishment of the September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund of 2001 (VCF), and publication of the rules that
would be used to allocate charitable funds and VCF dollars provoked
enormous controversy over the definitions of fair compensation and
distributive justice. The controversy over the allocation of charitable
4. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV.
1405 (2002).
5. In 2002, South Carolina became the first federal district court to adopt a rule limiting sealed
settlements (See D.S.C. Loc. Civ. R. 5.03(C), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.govRules/
mon.2003/cv/chs.pdf). See also Eric Frazier, Judges Veto Sealed Deals, 24 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12,
2002, at Al. In some instances, judges have even sealed jury awards of damages. See Margaret
Cronin Fisk, Hey! We Just Won... Shhhhhh! An $112 Million Award in 2001, A Lawyer's Career
High Was Ordered Sealed, 25 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at A5. For commentary on sealed settle-
ments, see Charles Notebloom, Courts Get Wise to Harmful Secret Settlements, TEX. LAW. Oct. 7,
2002, at 46; John Segal, Sunlight or Shadow: South Carolina Bans Sealed Settlements, 228 N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at S6.
6. For example, in their study of jury trials in Pima County, Arizona, Shari Diamond and Neil
Vidmar found that defendants did not contest liability in 18% of cases reaching verdict. See
Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1857, 1872 n.54 (2001).
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contributions was widely reported by the media. Thousands of peo-
ple, including victims and nonvictims, submitted comments on the
proposed rules for the VCF to Special Master Kenneth Feinberg,
which were mounted on the VCF website. In this Article, I analyze
this commentary to explore how injury and wrongful death victims
and the public think about the relationship between money and jus-
tice. Part II discusses the theoretical and practical perspectives on
compensation that shaped my analysis. Subpart A reviews instrumen-
tal and expressive theories of compensation. Subpart B suggests how
these theories may play out in practice, drawing on plaintiffs' state-
ments about their motivation for litigating, as reported in book and
newspaper accounts of actual civil damage lawsuits. Part III turns to
the response to the September 11th attacks, focusing on concerns
about how to compensate those who lost family members in the at-
tacks. Subpart A discusses media accounts of the charitable and gov-
ernment responses to the losses suffered as a result of the September
11th attacks, focusing on the theories of compensation displayed in
these accounts. Subpart B presents the results of my analysis of com-
ments submitted to Special Master Feinberg, focusing on differences
in interpretations of distributive justice between the members of the
general public who submitted comments to the Special Master and
those who lost family members in the attacks. Part IV discusses the
implications of the analysis for the broader public policy debate over
tort damages.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON COMPENSATION
Despite their seeming centrality to tort litigation, there has been
little systematic research on accidental injury victims, and the research
to date has focused on victims' decisions to claim, rather than their
subjective valuations of their losses. 7 We know very little about how
accident victims who sue think about how much money they should
7. Although the conventional view of Americans is that they are highly litigious, to date, em-
pirical research has found the opposite. Most people who are injured in accidents, in which
there was another party who could have been construed as the injurer, never attempt to collect
compensation from that party. Except in the case of automobile accidents, Americans usually
attribute accidents that cause injuries to "fate," "nature," or their own clumsiness, laziness, or
inattention. And even when their injuries are quite serious or quite costly, most Americans do
not think of suing another person or entity unless they blame that person or entity for what
occurred. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1991). It is not clear why some people blame others for their misfortunes,
while other similarly situated persons do not, although researchers have suggested that
"scripts"-earned social responses-may explain higher rates of claiming in automobile acci-




and do ultimately get.8 There has been considerably more research
about how juries decide tort cases and award damages.9 Juries are
instructed to consider specific types of damages (e.g., past medical ex-
penses, work loss) when deciding what amount of compensation to
award to successful plaintiffs. Empirical research shows that compen-
satory damage awards are correlated with injury severity, which in
turn is correlated with economic loss,10 suggesting that jurors gener-
ally follow these directions. In contrast, when deciding what amount
to award for nonmonetary loss (general damages), juries are given lit-
tle or no guidance. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is wide variation in
the general damages components of jury verdicts.1 Vidmar argues
that, rather than reflecting an absence of specific guidelines, variabil-
ity in general damages may reflect jurors' careful analysis of legitimate
elements of nonmonetary loss (e.g., disfigurement, loss of consortium,
hedonic damages) and their analysis of the highly varied consequences
of such nonmonetary losses for plaintiffs.' 2 But there has been little
research on how jurors think about the task of setting a value on the
noneconomic component of personal injury or death. Nor do we
know what the relationship is between jurors' and victims' valuations
of loss and life.
8. Most tort litigants are represented by lawyers, and it is reasonable to suppose that their
lawyers shape their expectations about the economic value of their suits. E. Allan Lind et al.
found that a majority of tort litigants got less than they had anticipated at the beginning of the
suit. But Lind et al. did not explore how litigants arrived at their assessments of how their losses
should be valued for compensation purposes. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIOANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989).
9. For reviews of recent findings, see Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil
Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determin-
ing Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103
(2002). Researchers have explored, inter alia, how defendant characteristics affect liability deci-
sions (see, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the "Deep Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & Soc'v REV. 121 (1996)); the degree of
variability in compensatory awards, conditional on injury severity (see, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg
et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908
(1989)); and how cognitive biases (e.g., "anchoring") and group dynamics affect punitive dam-
ages awards (see, e.g., David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998)).
10. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9; see also PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985). But jurors may sometimes take
into account other legally inappropriate factors such as insurance and attorney fees. See also
Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9.
12. Vidmar, supra note 9.
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A. Theories of Compensation
1. Deterrence
Over the past several decades, tort scholarship has been dominated
by economic analyses. Law and economics scholars argue that the pri-
mary purpose of tort damages is deterrence, not compensation. 13
From a deterrence perspective, arriving at the proper level of compen-
sation for accidental injury and wrongful death victims is a matter of
determining what amount of damages should be imposed on wrongdo-
ers ex post in order to assure that ex ante potential wrongdoers will
weigh the costs of injury against the benefits of productive activity.
Performing this calculation requires making complex behavioral as-
sumptions about risk-taking and risk-avoiding behavior of injurers
and victims, victims' disposition to claim, and other legal actors' deci-
sions, including lawyers, judges and juries. Victims' valuations of their
losses enter into deterrence analyses only to the extent that ex ante
such valuations deter the victims' own risky behavior.14
2. Corrective Justice
We might anticipate that tort scholars who champion a corrective
justice rationale for tort compensation-a rationale that is deontologi-
cal rather than utilitarian-would be more interested than deterrence
theorists in the victim's perspective because it is the victim who has
suffered the injustice that needs correcting.15 But corrective justice
theorists' arguments for when victims deserve compensation depend
(at least in some versions of the theory) on their beliefs about when
harmdoers should have to pay those whom they injure. Hence, while
they may begin with a concern about victims, corrective justice theo-
rists often move on rather quickly to questions surrounding
13. For a review and synthesis of this literature, see Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories
of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1135 (2003).
14. Some analysts have considered the possibility that victims' estimations of their losses ex
ante and ex post may differ. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for Helping Juries DetermineTort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV.
773 (1995); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995). But these analyses are not based on empirical
inquiries into actual victims' valuations of their losses.
15. Corrective justice theory lacks the coherence that derives from economists' single-minded
pursuit of social welfare maximization. Some corrective justice theorists view the rejection of
economic analysis of torts as a core principle; others embrace some aspects of economic analysis
while viewing them as having only secondary importance. For a discussion of the history of
modem corrective justice theory, see George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary-and Tort Theory,
50 UCLA L. REV. 279 (2002).
2003]
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harmdoers16-which leaves them very much in the same territory as
deterrence theorists. 17
Most corrective justice scholars have not invested much energy in
parsing different kinds of losses or in thinking about how victims
themselves might value different kinds of losses. 18 But philosopher
Jean Hampton argues that distinguishing among different kinds of
losses is essential to deciding when the law ought to exact retribution
from harmdoers and when mere compensation for harmful behavior
may suffice.19 Hampton argues that only behavior that inflicts moral
injury is deserving of retribution.20 Wrongful injury to material worth
can be corrected by compensating the injury victims for their material
losses. Hampton defines moral injury as a denial or diminishment of a
person's intrinsic value, a failure to recognize certain "entitlements"
16. Victims have also received surprisingly little attention in criminal law scholarship, despite
their prominence in the public discourse on crime. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims
in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J.
349 (1992). In his early writings, Coleman argued that the situations of the injurer and injured
could be considered separately. See Jules L. Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to
Compensate, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV. 451 (1987). However, later, Coleman became persuaded that
the relationship between injurer and victim (termed variously "connectedness" and "correlativ-
ity") was central to the notion of corrective justice. See Jules L. Coleman, Adding Institutional
Insult to Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 223 (1991); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of
Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ L. REV. 15 (1995). Under the principle of "correlativity," corrective
justice contains an element of distributive justice: the wrong that has to be "corrected" is the
misallocation between the wrongdoer's gains (from his illegitimate behavior) and the victim's
consequential losses. But this distributive element is arguably different from distributive justice
defined as a macro-level allocation of societal resources. See Fletcher, supra note 15.
18. What amount wrongdoers should pay victims-whether they should disgorge their ill-got-
ten gains or cover victims' losses, and what should happen if the two are not equivalent-has
been the subject of scholarly debate. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective
Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277 (1994) (considering whether the losses imposed on the wrongdoer's
victim can be conceptualized as equivalent to the gains enjoyed by the wrongdoer as a result of
his sanctionable behavior). Weinrib distinguishes between "material" conceptions of gain and
loss-defined as actual resources obtained and gained as a result of the injurer's behavior-and
"normative" conceptions-defined as the "discrepanc[y] between what the parties have and
what they should have according to the norm governing their interaction." Id. at 282-83. But
whether losses and gains are defined in terms of material or norms, corrective justice theorists'
perspective is what ought to be required of the wrong-doer, rather than what might be deserved
by the victim.
19. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1666 (1992).
20. Hampton's theory of retribution is not limited to criminal punishment but rather encom-
passes all efforts to vindicate the moral value of the injured victim; indeed, she suggests that in
some instances the award of punitive damages in civil lawsuits might better satisfy this objective
than criminal punishment. Id. at 1687-89. (discussing Marc Galanter and David Luban's analy-
sis of the jury's punitive damage award in the Ford Pinto Case). See Marc Galanter & David
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993).
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that are associated with the person's value.2' Importantly, Hampton's
theory of moral injury is grounded on an objective assessment of the
affront to dignity, an assessment that rests on the social meaning of
the harm or wrongful act.22 Whether the victims themselves under-
stand or recognize the affront is not relevant to deciding whether the
law should aim at retribution. 23
Although, for Hampton, the idea of moral injury is central to a the-
ory of retribution, but not central to a theory of compensation, the
notion of dignitary injuries may in fact be important to understanding
how tort victims think about compensation. Whether or not they re-
gard their injuries themselves as affronts, tort victims may evaluate
offers of compensation and awards, not just in terms of how well these
offers and awards match material losses, but also how well they accord
with their sense of personal dignity.24
3. Distributive Justice
Experimental psychologists and behavioral economists have found
that, in a wide variety of social contexts, people evaluate monetary
exchanges in terms other than, or in addition to, economic self-inter-
est.25 Psychologists who study people's preferences for, and assess-
ment of, the fairness of different schemes for allocating scarce
resources have found that individuals do not always favor distribution
rules that maximize their self-interest. In many circumstances, people
prefer distribution rules that equalize the ratios between individuals'
contributions to group activity-for example, hours worked or level of
effort-and outcomes (e.g., wages) across group members. People
may even prefer a merit or contribution-based distribution principle
when its adoption would lead to they themselves receiving less of
some scarce resource than they would otherwise.2 6 When individuals
21. Hampton, supra note 19, at 1674, 1678. As Hampton explains, her notion of moral worth
is equivalent to Kant's egalitarian definition of human worth. Hampton suggests that the "enti-
tlements" to respect that derive from humans' value as "ends in themselves" might also be un-
derstood as "rights" but does not develop that point further in this paper.
22. Id. at 1677-78.
23. Id. at 1671.
24. As indicated above, Hampton's theory of retribution does not require that the victim of
wrongdoing recognize an affront. In contrast, I focus on victims' subjective assessments of com-
pensation offers and awards. However, in practice, the difference may collapse if a victim's
subjective assessment is based on her understanding of how others will interpret the meaning of
the offer or award.
25. For a review of this literature, see Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Reci-
procity (on file with author). See also Dale Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 1, 1053 (1999).
26. See J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE:
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
find themselves in situations that they view as inequitable-for exam-
ple, because those whom they view as more meritorious receive lesser
rewards than those whom they view as less meritorious-they will
take actions to resolve these inequities, sometimes including actions
that reduce their own rewards.27 These findings suggest that people
evaluate distributive outcomes in terms of their social meaning, as
well as in terms of economic self-interest. 28
Preferences for different distributive justice principles vary with the
social context in which resources are to be allocated.29 In task-ori-
ented contexts, such as the workplace, most people prefer equitable or
contribution-based distribution. But in contexts in which individuals'
group identification outweighs concern about individual effort-for
example, church groups or other social organizations-people may
prefer to distribute benefits (and costs) equally among group mem-
bers. Dividing resources and expenditures equally avoids making in-
vidious comparisons among members that might threaten group
solidarity. In intimate caring relationships, such as the relationship
between parents and young children or adult children and their eld-
erly parents, people may wish to distribute resources according to
need, without regard to merit or equality concerns. Because objec-
tively similar social contexts may be perceived differently according to
circumstance, it may be possible to manipulate individuals' distribu-
tive justice preferences by changing their perceptions of context.
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1985). For a review of the extensive social psycholog-
ical research on distributive justice, see Karen A. Hegtvedt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Jus-
tice: Recent Theoretical Developments and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 93 (Joseph Sanders & Lee Hamilton eds., 2000). Unfortunately. there has been little effort
to date to apply distributive justice theory to empirical research on legal disputes.
27. Hegtvedt & Cook, supra note 26, at 96. Individuals may resolve perceived inequities by
exaggerating their own contributions-a self-interested move-or by devaluing their own contri-
butions (so as to rationalize a lesser reward). See Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity
Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151 (1973).
28. Sociologists and psychologists have written about the noneconomic meanings of money.
See, e.g., VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) (discussing how class,
gender, and other socio-economic variables affect the way money is perceived and handled);
ADRIAN FURNHAM & MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY (1998) (discussing atti-
tudes towards money and patterns of behavior in obtaining, spending and saving money). But
these works do not treat the question of how tort compensation is interpreted by plaintiffs.
29. Although there is empirical evidence that social context affects preferences for different
distributive justice principles, other factors also affect allocation preferences, including: identity
of the allocating decision-maker (e.g., gender); the activities in which the group is engaged (e.g.,
cleaning up the family home versus celebrating a family holiday); and the cultural context in
which the allocation is taking place (e.g., Americans appear to have a stronger preference for
equitable allocations than Northern Europeans or Southeast Asians). It is hard to discern clear
explanations for allocation preferences from the hundreds of studies that have been conducted.
Nor has anyone developed a compelling theoretical framework in which to subsume the myriad
and other conflicting study results. See Hegtvedt & Cook, supra note 26.
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The tort system's approach to determining damages-striving to
make the faultless injured plaintiff (or the dependents who lost a fam-
ily member as a result of someone else's wrongful action) "whole"-
does not fit precisely any of the three common definitions of distribu-
tive justice. (Hence, perhaps, the attractiveness of the law-and-eco-
nomics deterrence rationale for damage calculations.) The
contribution or equity principle dominates the calculation of what it
takes to make the injured plaintiff whole, the need principle plays a
modest role, and the equality principle is nowhere to be seen. Liable
tort defendants are required to pay for plaintiffs' lost market value
(e.g., wage loss, market value of household contributions, etc.), for
past and future medical needs (including medical bills, rehabilitation,
and physical aids) and for nonmonetary losses (e.g., "pain and suffer-
ing"). In principle, there is no adjustment to the market value calcula-
tion-arguably a measure of social contribution or merit-to reflect
need or equality concerns. Plaintiffs whose annual earnings were in
the tens of millions prior to injury are owed all of that amount (if they
experienced full wage loss and were not deemed negligent them-
selves), and plaintiffs who earned below minimum wage prior to in-
jury are owed only that amount.30 Insurance adjusters routinely
calculate pain and suffering damages as a multiple of economic loss, 31
so that in ordinary litigation these damages mainly reflect the mar-
ket's assessment of the injured person's worth as well. And, under the
collateral source rule, the fact that a plaintiff's needs will be covered
by disability, health, or other insurance is not factored into the calcu-
lation of damages owed to that plaintiff.
In wrongful death cases, state statutes specify how economic loss is
to be calculated. Typically, loss calculations reflect estimates of the
decedents' future earnings and contributions to their households.
Need may be factored into the damages calculation by subtracting the
deceased's own consumption of resources from the amount deemed to
represent the deceased's lost future contributions to the household.
But equity principles shape both the definition of contribution (e.g.,
the deceased's wage and benefits package) and the definition of con-
sumption (e.g., the deceased's expenditures, which surely reflect
wages and benefits). Rather than imposing a societal definition of
30. In practice, damage awards for plaintiffs at the high end of the income distribution may be
capped by defendants' insurance limits or for other reasons. See, e.g., ELIZABETH KING &
JAMES SMITH, ECONOMIC Loss AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS (1988). But set-
tlement amounts do roughly track economic loss. See, e.g., DANZON, supra note 10.
31. See H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 108 (1980).
2003]
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need on the damage calculation, the tort system accepts the market's
definition of worth.32
Notwithstanding tort doctrine and practice, the need and equality
principles of distributive justice may be brought back into the calcula-
tion of damages by jurors, if their perceptions of tort victims-as fel-
low workers or fellow members of a closely-knit community or as
members of their extended "family"-influence their awards. Such
considerations may help to explain "outlier" jury awards-for exam-
ple, the award of $150 million by a Mississippi jury to six asbestos
workers who claimed asbestos related injuries but no functional
impairment. 33
4. Procedural Justice
In most circumstances, tort victims themselves are not in a position
to evaluate the distributive justice of tort outcomes because they have
little information about how similarly situated plaintiffs fare.34 "Rou-
tine" tort settlements rarely make the news; it is only the largest set-
tlements and verdicts that catch the attention of the media.35 Social
psychological research on the perceived fairness of dispute resolution
and other transactional procedures suggests that laypeople may use
their intuitions about the fairness of procedures as a proxy for assess-
ing outcome fairness in situations when they cannot compare their
32. The controversy over the VCF's rules for calculating damages reflected, in part, differ-
ences in expert opinions about how to translate legal definitions of loss in wrongful death cases
into economic calculations. Although experts differ in their procedures for performing loss esti-
mations, their estimates rest on the human capital approach to valuing life. See KING & SMrTH,
supra note 30.
33. Mississippi Jury Returns $150M Verdict Against AC&S, Dresser Industries, 3M Corp.,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Nov. 9, 2001, at 4.
34. Plaintiffs' ability to compare compensation offers may be enhanced in high profile liability
cases. For example, when Libya offered $2.7 billion in compensation to 270 families who lost
relatives in the 1988 aircrash over Lockerbie, Scotland (which was attributed to Libyan agents),
France objected to the settlement on the grounds that it would give more money to the Lock-
erbie families than to the families who lost relatives in a 1989 aircrash in Niger that was also
traced to the Libyan government. See Craig Smith, Libya To Inflate Amount Paid in '89 Bomb-
ing, N.Y.TMES, Sept. 1, 2003, at A7. The 1999 Niger settlement totaled $33 million in compen-
sation for 170 deaths. Felicity Barringer, U.N. to Weigh Proposal To End 1988 Penalties Against
Libya, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at A13. As a condition for lifting sanctions against Libya, as
specified in the Lockerbie settlement, the French government demanded that Libya provide
additional money to the Niger aircrash victims. Id.
35. See Donald S. Bailis, & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAw & HUM. BEH. 419
(1996). Because the media over-reports plaintiff victories and high jury awards, including puni-
tive damage awards, tort victims may tend to overestimate the value of their claims.
[Vol. 53:417
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outcomes to others'. 36 Like distributive justice, procedural justice is
interpreted socially: perceptions of procedural fairness are strongly
linked to concerns about self-worth, defined in relation to social group
standing.37
Perhaps plaintiffs view settlement offers and jury verdicts as indicat-
ing their relative group standing and assess these offers-and how
"fair" or "just" the offers or verdicts are-in relation to what the
amounts signal about plaintiffs' and their loved ones' social "market
value," 38 rather than in relation to their actual losses, both economic
and noneconomic. Such views might have particular import in wrong-
ful death and catastrophic neonatal injury cases when defendants and
juries are explicitly called upon to place a value on the deceased or
catastrophically injured person's life. When plaintiffs perceive tort
outcomes as signaling that society does not place a high value on the
lives of these loved ones, they may experience a moral injury or af-
front to their personal dignity.39 Conversely, they may seek high set-
tlement or awards to confirm that their loved one's life had value.
B. How Plaintiffs Think About Tort Compensation
What little we know about how tort victims think about their
losses40 comes to us from book-length depictions of tort lawsuits and
news reports. 41 In these accounts, victims talk about their need for
money, but also about their desires for accountability. They also talk
36. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RE-
SEARCH IN LAW, supra note 26; E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolu-
tion: Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 224 (1993).
37. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE 230 (1988).
38. Margaret Radin has written about how "universal commodification" rhetoric shapes peo-
ple's attitudes and behaviors in a wide range of contexts. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CON-
TESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
39. The idea that legal outcomes have noninstrumental or expressive purposes and conse-
quences has figured prominently in recent legal scholarship. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Ex-
pressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
40. The "we" here refers to those of us who do not practice tort law. Plaintiffs' lawyers obvi-
ously have considerable experience discussing loss and compensation with their clients. How-
ever, I am not aware of any empirical research on claimants' valuation of their losses that has
been conducted using plaintiffs' attorneys as sources.
41. Mass tort litigation especially has spawned a number of marvelous books on the evolution
of civil damage lawsuits, drawing on interviews with key participants, as well as court documents.
See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED,
WOMEN AND THE-DALKON SHIELD (1985); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY
OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998); RICHARD R. SOBOL: BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON BANKRUPTCY (1991): PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987).
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about how monetary offers of settlement confer (or withhold) social
standing on their injured or lost loved ones-and, by extension, on
them. Because most of these plaintiffs are only aware of their own
circumstances (or of a few other people in similar circumstances), they
rarely compare their experiences to others'.
Of course, the voices of these victims are filtered through the re-
porters' ears, which may well have been tuned to pay more attention
to some of the victims' statements than to others. Moreover, the vic-
tims themselves, knowing they are speaking "for the record" may nat-
urally attempt to present themselves in the best light possible.
Nonetheless, what victims tell reporters offers some indications of the
ways in which victims think about their losses.
Few of the plaintiffs in these narratives deny having an interest in
getting money to compensate them for their economic and emotional
losses. Speaking about the settlement of a lawsuit on behalf of her
severely impaired son who allegedly was injured at birth, Donna
Sabias says:
I didn't feel like we had answers... I felt, okay, now we can pay our
bills.4 2
Another time she recalls telling her lawyer:
No amount of money is going to justify what's happened to this
family.
But she also recalls telling the lawyer that money could provide mate-
rial support that would help to ameliorate the family's situation.4 3
Although money is an objective, plaintiffs claim to have other
objectives as well. Talking to his lawyer about what he wants from the
lawsuit on behalf of his son, Tony Sabias says:
Show me an admission of guilt,... and I don't want a thing.44
Discussing whether to settle a suit brought on behalf of his young son,
who died of leukemia, allegedly as a result of drinking contaminated
water in Woburn, Massachusetts, Richard Toomey says:
I didn't get into this for the money. I got into this because I want to
find them guilty for what they did. I want the world to know that.45
Responding to a $2.7 billion settlement of claims against Libya arising
out of the 1988 bombing of an airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, Ste-
phanie Bernstein, who lost her husband in the crash said:
42. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF
MEDICINE 210 (1998).
43. Id. at 312.
44. Id. at 367.
45. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 442 (1995).
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I'm very pleased. It says in front of the whole world that the Libyan
regime ordered this and that they're responsible.46
Plaintiffs see making defendants pay money as a means towards
these nonmonetary ends. Writing about the death of her husband al-
legedly as the result of medical negligence, Sandra Gilbert says:
[M]oney isn't the issue .... But accountability is. How do you en-
sure accountability without punitive damages? How do you keep
irresponsible doctors from killing people if they don't have to pay
for their mistakes? I mean, no sum of money can replace my hus-
band, but .... 47
But plaintiffs often learn that settlements do not serve their ends.
Talking about the settlement of the Agent Orange class action lawsuit,
Vietnam veteran Michael Ryan says:
The settlement doesn't establish the truth. How am I supposed to
explain to Kerry [his daughter] what happened to her? Where was
her day in court? 4
8
Only rarely do these accounts show us vengeful plaintiffs. 49 But oc-
casionally plaintiffs invoke the concept of corrective justice, describing
their desire to hurt defendants, as they have been hurt. Talking about
what motivated her to sue the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, a
plaintiff says:
I felt that the A.H. Robins Company knew what they were doing to
these women. They knew. I wouldn't care if I hadn't gotten two
cents out of it, if the publicity would make people realize what a
crummy company that is. 50
But often plaintiffs find they cannot hurt defendants enough. Dis-
cussing settlement of her claim against the Woburn, Massachusetts
toxic tort defendants, Dana Robbins says:
[S]ix point six million... I don't think that hurts them enough. 51
Another Woburn plaintiff says:
I hate them, those people who put the stuff into the ground. Why
can't they lose a son or daughter? Taking their money is not going
to hurt them. 52
46. Lynette Clemetson, Lockerbie Victims' Relatives See Glimmer of Hope, N.Y.TIMES, Aug.
16, 2003, at A6. Some of the Lockerbie victims' families objected to the terms of the settlements,
which offered more money to the families if the United States lifted sanctions against Libya. Id.
47. SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY 217 (1994).
48. SCHUCK, supra note 41, at 171-72.
49. There is, in fact, little reason to believe that tort victims generally are motivated by retri-
bution or revenge. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7.
50. MiNTrz, supra note 41, at 13.
51. HARR, supra note 45, at 443.
52. Id. at 150.
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Sandra Gilbert writes of the doctors whom she believes caused her
husband's death:
[E]ven if we define payments for a family's pain and suffering as in
some sense punitive damages.., it is questionable whether any kind
of punishment can inflict upon [the doctors] will mean very much to
any of [them] personally. Not one of [them are] out of pocket be-
cause of Elliot's death; not one of [them have] ever been asked to
apologize to me, much less compensate me for my loss. 53
Speaking of the proposed settlement of the Lockerbie aircrash claims,
Susan Cohen, who lost her daughter in the crash, says:
My daughter is dead, and he [Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi]
is not, and there is nothing they can say, no amount of money, that
can restore what I've lost. 5
4
Sometimes in these accounts people struggle to explain the relation-
ship between obtaining money for lost lives or injuries and justice.
Such issues have been central to accounts of the litigation against
Swiss banks and German industry on behalf of holocaust victims. Dis-
cussing his reasons for leading the effort to obtain compensation for
holocaust victims, Israel Singer says:
What we are doing today is rehumanizing these individuals posthu-
mously and saying that the grand theft that took place in fifteen
countries was not permissible. That rehumanization and rebreath-
ing of life into these people, into these dry bones, is what our activ-
ity is all about. It's not about money.55
But after multi-billion dollar settlements have been reached with
Swiss banks and German corporations, he is not certain that he
achieved his aims:
It hasn't produced something lasting [he says]. I am proud of the.
fact that I got 92,500 new pensions for Eastern Europeans, where
people were struggling. Those people's lives have been changed im-
measurably. But maybe I didn't succeed in what I wanted to do.
Maybe these dollars are all I got, and I didn't succeed in getting all I
wanted. Just one billion dollars of the money are important, but the
other five or six billion, I don't know how important they are. 56
Talking about the money offered to settle claims of Holocaust victims,
Auschwitz survivor Jamie Rothman says:
It's not justice. Whenever you touch the subject, and you put the
money and the suffering together, it's not the way to do it. 57
53. GILBERT, supra note 47, at 332.
54. Clemetson, supra note 46.
55. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIMS' FORTUNE: INSIDE THE Epic BATTLE
OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 2 (2002).
56. Id. at 381-82.
57. Id. at 1.
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After receiving his own share of the settlement, he still feels the same
way:
The point is always the same .... Too little, too late. But if it had
been earlier or larger, it would have been no more moral.58
Commenting on the settlement of the Lockerbie aircrash claims
against Libya, Dan Cohen, who lost a daughter in the crash said:
This is supposed to be about justice and the truth. Instead, what the
Libyans proposed amounted to a bribe.5 9
Beyond compensation, beyond accountability, perhaps even beyond
justice, there is the sense that money confers meaning, acknowledg-
ment of what has happened, of what has been lost. Talking about his
ineligibility for a victims' compensation fund established for those in-
jured and killed by the Washington, D.C. snipers in 2002, Paul Ruffa
says:
They keep saying that mine was just a robbery. I got shot six times.
To me it was not just a robbery .... It's all about acknowledgement,
it's not about money, although money is money. It's about acknowl-
edging that it was more than just a robbery. He tried to kill me first
60
Writing of her husband, Sondra Gilbert asks:
How would one calculate a sum to replace the dead person? Would
some jury decide on, say, $100,000 for his hands, $50,000 for his
beard and his thick dark eyebrows, $75,000 for his hazel eyes?61
Anguished, angry, or disappointed, the voices of plaintiffs heard in
these accounts captured the attention of authors and reporters. But
how often do those who have been injured by others through no fault
of their own think about obtaining compensation so as to punish those
who harmed them or deter future wrongdoers? Do people compare
their misfortunes to others when deciding what, if anything, they are
owed for their misfortune by those who harmed them or by society
generally? Does the experience of tort litigation-becoming a legal
victim-somehow change how people interpret what has happened to
them or how they assess what is owed them? The losses wreaked by
the September 11th attackers provided an occasion for a national dis-
course on society's obligations to victims and the role of the tort sys-
tem in meeting these obligations.
58. Id. at 387.
59. Clemetson, supra note 46.
60. Jayson Blair, Peace and Answers Eluding Victims of the Sniper Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2003, at Al.
61. GILBERT, supra note 47, at 217.
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III. THE MEANING OF MONEY.
Because the statute authorizing the September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund of 200162 was adopted so quickly, Congress missed (or
avoided) the opportunity for a public debate about who should be
eligible for compensation, how that compensation should be allocated,
and who should pay the costs of compensation. 63 Congress quickly
decided that all those who lost family members in the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the air crash in Shank-
sville, Pennsylvania would be compensated by taxpayers, and that
state tort law (with a few notable exceptions) would provide the
model for allocation.64 Detailed eligibility and loss assessment rules
were left to a special master (whose role was specified in the statute)
to determine. 65 But the public debate over fairness that Congress
avoided when it passed the statute arose quickly thereafter.
A. Giving Away Money:66 The Public Debate
Even before Special Master Kenneth Feinberg was appointed, the
rationale for the Fund was being questioned, and after his appoint-
ment the debate ratcheted sharply upward. In the three months fol-
lowing the attacks, the New York Times published seventy articles
(including opinion editorials and letters) dealing with victim compen-
sation. 67 By September 14, 2001, the Times had a letter from a reader
worried by the "disgusting thought" that victims would be generating
"billions in legal fees for lawyers who represent them," and asking
62. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, tit. 4, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 stat. 230
(2001).
63. For discussions of the legislative history and public policy rationales for government com-
pensation of the September llth victims, see Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund:
Born From a Unique Confluence of Events Not Likely to be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209
(2003) and Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2003). See also Belkin, supra note 2.
64. For discussions of the VCF's rules, see Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O'Grady, The
Victim Compensation Fund-Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 231
(2003).
65. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 404(a)(2). Attorney General
John Ashcroft appointed Kenneth Feinberg Special Master on November 26, 2001. See U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Names Special Master To Head September 11th Com-
pensation Program (Nov. 26, 2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/dojpr2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 13, 2003).
66. I borrow this subtitle from my former colleague Mark Peterson's article on mass tort
claiming facilities. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on
Claims Resolution Facilities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1990, at 113.
67. The first New York Times article on compensating victims' families appeared on Septem-




Congress to provide financial support as a substitute for "insurance
and lawsuits."'68 Within two weeks of Congress's adoption of the
VCF, the New York Times was reporting that the Fund had already
"begun to generate both resentment and confusion about its ultimate
fairness and effectiveness. '69
Concurrent with the debate over the Fund, there was mounting con-
troversy over the role of charitable organizations in compensating the
victims of the September 11th attacks. 70 The New York Times pub-
lished 168 articles (including editorials and letters) on charitable re-
sponses to September 11th between September 12 and December 31,
2001.71 As millions of dollars in donations arrived on their desks from
all parts of the globe, charitable organizations struggled to devise rules
for assisting the victims. Some charitable organizations reached out
beyond the immediate victims to those who had not been at the attack
sites but nonetheless suffered significant economic losses, and many
organizations offered a variety of forms of assistance. The multiplicity
of organizations involved in the charitable effort raised significant co-
ordination issues. 72 Moreover, as the VCF's rules began to take
shape, questions arose about how the charitable organizations' activi-
ties would intersect with the Fund's decisions. 73
A central question in the public debate was how to allocate govern-
ment and charitable funds among victims whose situations prior to the
attacks were vastly different. As time progressed, some also ques-
tioned the appropriateness of treating September 11th victims and
their losses differently from the victims of other terrorist attacks or
from victims of misfortune more generally. 74 "Why is it right for a
68. Tom Olson, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 4-10.
69. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: Victims' Compensation;
Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore Point, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
70. For discussion of charitable contributions to September 11th victims, see Robert A. Katz,
Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL
L. REv. 547 (2003).
71. Some of these articles also referred to the Victim Compensation Fund. Some articles
related to the September l1th charities referred to Islamic organizations that were suspected of
aiding terrorists. My search excluded these articles but unintentionally may also have excluded
articles about Islamic organizations that were attempting to aid the terrorists' U.S. victims.
72. See, e.g., Editorial, Charity and Red Tape, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at A16; Frank Bruni,
Show Us the Money, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 60.
73. See David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Debate
Over Rules for Victims Fund, N.Y.TMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at Al.
74. By the end of November, legislation had been introduced in Congress providing compen-
sation to victims of other terrorist events. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation
Challenged: The Federal Fund; Officials Move to Aid Families of Embassy Bombing Victims,
N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at B9. See also September l1th Compensation: The Impossibility of
Making Whole, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2003, at 65-66; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How
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New York stockbroker's widow to be given millions of dollars and not
a poor farmer's family in Oklahoma?" asked a woman who had lost
her four-year-old daughter in the 1995 attack on the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City.75
Commentary on the government program and on charitable giving
invoked all of the different concepts of distributive justice that social
psychologists have observed in their research. Invoking the equity
principle, some families of rescue workers argued that they deserved a
larger share of charity than other victims' families because their rela-
tives sacrificed their lives to save others,76 and some families of pri-
vate security officers who lost their lives in the World Trade Center
said that it was unfair that they had received so little from various
private and public funds compared to the families of firefighters. 77
Families of civilian victims argued that many were called to heroic acts
on September 11th. "Nobody got up to the floors where my husband
was," one victim's wife was quoted as saying. "Don't tell me there
weren't people up there trying to do heroic things. They had to be
their own heroes and help each other. '78
Invoking the equality principle, some families argued that all vic-
tims, or all victims within a certain group, should get paid the same
amount, and some charities paid equal benefits to victims, without re-
gard to need.79 "I just believe everyone should be treated equal," said
the wife of a private security guard who died in the attacks, "I don't
think one should get more than the other. We're all in it together." 80
"This is not equal," said Kathleen Teanor, the Oklahoma mother who
Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value of Three Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002,
at 49.
75. Belkin, supra note 2, at 95. Kathleen Treanor, the Oklahoma mother quoted in Belkin's
article, eventually filed a lawsuit charging that Congress violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause when it established the September llth compensation fund. Seeking
answers herself for the disparate treatment accorded victims of different misfortunes, reporter
Belkin asked, "Are we a country... [that] treats compensation [for injury and death] matter-of-
factly, as a way to address a surviving family's basic needs? Or is money for us a metaphor,
meant to signal our regret?" Id. at 149.
76. David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Those Who Lost Homes or Jobs Are
To Get $2,500 Grants, N.Y.TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2001, at Bl.
77. Steven Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: Compensation: Survivors See Inequity in Aid to
Families of Guards Who Died, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at B7.
78. David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Families; Gifts to Rescu-
ers Divide Survivors, N.Y.TMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al.
79. Barstow, supra note 76. (reporting that the September llth Fund would pay 20,000 New
Yorkers who lost jobs or residences as a result of the September 11th attacks $2,500 apiece, and
families who lost relatives in the attacks $10,000 apiece, without regard to need or to receipt of
other charitable contributions).
80. Greenhouse, supra note 77.
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lost her daughter in the Murrah building but received no government
compensation as a result.8
Others invoked the need principle-although at the same time en-
dorsing the contribution principle. "We cannot possibly overpay the
family of the uniformed services," the New York Times quoted the
head of a network of charities as saying, "But there are other peo-
ple-those who don't have any other resources-who need to be con-
sidered, too."'82 Appeals to the need principle were not limited to
those at the lower ends of the income scale. With families of firefight-
ers and other public safety personnel in the limelight and seemingly
the beneficiaries of extraordinary charity, some relatives of civilian
victims felt left out. "We just want to be recognized as needing, as
well," said the widow of an executive who lost his life in the World
Trade Center.83 Others called for compensation for gay partners of
victims-excluded from many benefit and charity programs-and for
undocumented immigrants.8 4
Observers cautioned that claimants (and the public) should not ex-
pect the new Fund to conform precisely to any of these definitions of
distributive justice.
[I]t is essential that the public understand the fund's basic purpose.
It is not charity. It is a Congressionally mandated alternative to liti-
gation that could have driven the airlines into bankruptcy-a pot of
money of undetermined size that is designed to substitute for
awards that victims' families would have received had they taken
the airlines to court ... Mr. Feinberg will be obliged to treat people
as if they had actually gone to court. That, in turn, means huge dif-
ferences in the final awards .. .a young stockbroker's family will
obviously receive far more than, say, the wife of a middle-aged
janitor. 85
But some questioned the "obviousness" of such consequences: 86
81. Belkin, supra note 2.
82. Jim Dwyer & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: Death Benefits, Money for Fami-
lies of Attack Victims Could Vary Widely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al. Critics of the VCF
also voiced procedural justice concerns, rejecting the proposition that funds might be allocated
systematically, according to a grid, rather than on an individualistic basis. See William Glaber-
son, A Nation Challenged: Compensation Claims; Federal Plan for an Aid Formula Is Criticized,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001.
83. Barstow & Henriques, supra note 78.
84. See, e.g., Denny Lee: Aid For Gay Terror Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at F2; Steven
Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: Compensation; Legal Residency Sought for Undocumented
Victims' Families, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at B7.
85. Editorial, The Victims' New Referee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at A26.
86. Sondra Leftoff, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at A28.
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Death would seem to level the playing field .... Yet the potential
distribution of the victims' fund for the Sept[ember] 11th tragedy
makes it clear that this expectation remains illusory.
The children of those who perished need all the help they can get
in moving forward. But those children already at the margins of so-
ciety will have that legacy imprinted on their future, as the compen-
sation they are entitled to in this settlement [the fund] reflects the
earning ability of their deceased parent.
In the extreme, compensation for such children will be less than
one-fifth of that which their most affluent counterparts will be enti-
tled to. This is one more tragedy within the tragedy they face.
As he pondered the rules for allocating damages, Special Master
Feinberg was conscious of competing definitions of justice. As the
New York Times reported in early December, 2001:87
[P]erhaps no question hangs over Mr. Feinberg and his every deci-
sion more ominously than the matter of fairness. A large part of
each award will be calculated by using estimates of a victim's life-
time earnings, and so differing assumptions will have to be made
about the earning power of a bond trader and a dishwasher. The
former earned more but might have retired or burned out earlier;
the latter earned less, but almost certainly would have worked most
of his life.
These disparate employment histories will necessarily require
awards of vastly different sizes-a fact that may not be palatable to
the public, Mr. Feinberg acknowledged. But he must somehow en-
sure that people in similar circumstances are treated similarly.
Mr. Feinberg has indicated that one possible partial solution to
the question of fairness could be to make sure the damages for
"pain and suffering" are calculated to ensure that every family gets
some minimum amount, regardless of its lost breadwinner's
paycheck88 Mr. Feinberg agrees that the equity8 9 hurdle is daunting,
although he will not yet commit to how he will try to overcome it.
One year later, the Special Master was still ruminating over the
question of how to deal with families' with vastly disparate life
circumstances.
It's a problem .... It's a philosophic problem, and it's a financial
problem. What to do with some of these people ... with incomes of
a million or two million. Are there no limitations? ... [S]hould the
87. Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: Compensation; Holding the Victims' Purse
Strings, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 2001, at B1.
88. The Special Master's thought here did not accord with traditional tort damage principles,
and his rule implementing this principle was later the target of much criticism. See infra text
accompanying note 92.
89. The NewYork Times reporter here seems to be using a common definition of equity as
equality, or similar treatment for similarly situated people, rather than using the more special-
ized definition found in the distributive justice literature. See discussion supra.
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taxpayer and this program subsidize a $10 million lifestyle and a $10
million tax-free award? 90
That Feinberg seemingly was troubled by the disparate outcomes
produced by incorporating tort principles in VCF rules troubled many
tort lawyers who saw in Feinberg's comments, not a questioning of the
justness of such outcomes, but rather a desire to save taxpayers'
money.91
As time passed, some observers began to see victims' families as
motivated more by greed than a desire for justice.92 In response, the
victims' families variously sought to explain why they needed financial
assistance and why they deserved it. "My ex-husband's will left every-
thing, including $1 million life insurance policy, to the new wife, and
once that is offset, then the children are left with less than $200,000
each for their father's death," said one claimant.93 "We're made to
feel bad for wanting everything that was promised by Congress.
When we were paying 50 percent of our money to the government in
taxes, did anyone have a problem with that?" said another. 94 "The
idea is to compensate me so my life style doesn't change, and my life
style is different from a guy washing dishes," said a third. "I don't live
in a two-hundred-and-fifty-dollar-a-month apartment. I live in a place
that costs me five thousand dollars a month in mortgage payments. 95
Those who lost family members in the attack also struggled to ex-
plain what money paid in compensation says about the meaning of
their loved ones' lives.
You'll hear it said many times here that people don't care about the
money, and it's true, we don't .... But somehow the higher the
amount, the more value they put on your loved one's life, the more
meaning it has. So I would like them to say we all get a trillion
dollars, just so I know my son was worth a trillion dollars .... 96
90. Belkin, supra note 2.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Elsie Miller, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A34. In her
letter, Miller stated:
Although I can sympathize with the personal losses suffered by families of the 9/11
victims, I am a bit dismayed by their continued push for more money from the fund...
After all, the compensation given to families of fallen soldiers and others who have
surrendered their lives in service to America is a mere pittance compared with the
amounts most victims' families will receive.
Id.
93. Belkin, supra note 2, at 94.
94. Id. at 148.
95. Kolbert, supra note 74.
96. Id. at 48.
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"They told me that my daughter was not worth as much as a New
York victim, and that's an ugly, ugly thing to say," said the mother
who lost her child in the Oklahoma City bombing.97
For these victims, money came to mean, not just the wherewithal to
cover their needs, nor a means of assuring accountability, nor even an
expression of society's compassion for their plight, but rather, what
the lives of their children were worth in the eyes of the community.
B. Questions of Fairness: Individual Perspectives
Media reporting and commentary on the establishment of the VCF,
its proposed rules for distributing compensation funds and charitable
donations, and other activities, offer a window into people's thoughts
about compensation for injury and death. Whether the victims of the
September 11th attacks were more or less deserving of help than the
victims of other tragedies, and what kinds of help, of what magnitude,
should be offered, by whom, and to whom, were all questions that
were hotly debated. But as is true of narrative histories of ordinary
tort litigants' experiences, the media reports were shaped by the per-
spectives of the reporters who decided whom to interview, whose
views to write about and what aspects of those views to highlight.
After Special Master Feinberg published the initial notice of admin-
istrative rulemaking regarding the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund of 2001, the VCF was inundated with public comments. In
all, the VCF received 6,363 comments in response to the Initial Notice
of Rule-making, 3,315 comments in response to the publication of the
Interim Rule, and 2,953 comments in response to the Final Rule.98
More than three quarters of those who submitted comments framed
their concerns in terms of "justice" or "fairness." 99
The comments submitted to the Special Master provide a different
sort of window into people's thoughts about compensation and dam-
ages. As is true of the media reports, the comments submitted to the
Special Master do not constitute a statistically representative sample
97. Belkin, supra note 2, at 95.
98. See www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation (last visited Apr. 15, 2003). Comments through
April 5, 2002 were posted on the site. Some of the comments were received after the deadlines
for commenting, indeed, the overwhelming majority of comments on the Initial Notice (5,557 of
6,363) were received after the deadline. Note that the total of 12,631 comments may represent
fewer people, as some people may have submitted multiple comments in one or more waves. We
drew the first and second samples in Summer 2002.
99. Determined by searching the full database, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation
(last visited Apr. 15, 2003). Using a search string that included "fair," "fairness," "justice," "un-
fair," "unfairness," and "unjust," I found 8,149 matches. Those who submitted comments on the
interim Final Rule were less likely to frame their comments in terms of justice or fairness; only
62% (2,061 of 3,315) used such terms in their comments.
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of the general population. Rather, they reflect the views of those who
cared enough about the VCF and its rules to write to the Special
Master. But the selectivity inherent in the comments is that of the
commentators; there is no intermediary between the commentators
and us.
All of the comments submitted to the VCF were ultimately posted
on the VCF's website. These comments provide a unique public
database for exploring how people feel about compensation for mis-
fortune and damage assessment, albeit under highly unusual circum-
stances. The Special Master's office redacted names and identifying
information. But many comments include information that indicates
whether the commentator is related to a victim of the terrorist attacks
or has some other direct personal relationship to the September 11th
events-for example, someone who was in the World Trade Center or
Pentagon, but survived the attacks. (Below I term those who lost
loved ones in the attacks "victims' survivors.") Some commentators
indicated that they had lost family members in other catastrophic acci-
dents, terrorist attacks, or in the military; others characterized them-
selves as "concerned citizens." This information provides an
opportunity to explore how responses to the VCF varied, depending
on the relationship of the commentator to the Fund. With the help of
my research assistants, I analyzed the comment data, focusing on what
commentators had to say about distributive justice.
1. Method
In the first data collection stage, we used a random number genera-
tor to select 450 comments for coding: 150 responses to the Notice,
150 responses to the Interim Rule, and 150 in response to the Final
Rule. Because the first two waves of comments included many form
letters, in a second stage, we randomly sampled additional individual
nonform letter responses to the Initial Notice and Interim Rule, with
the goal of obtaining a minimum number of 150 individual responses
to each. In all, we sampled 635 comments (including form letters), 256
responding to the Initial Notice, 229 responding to the Interim Rule,
and 150 responding to the Final Rule. Because each sample wave was
selected using a random number generator, we can combine the indi-
vidual responses from the two sampling stages for responses to the
Notice and to the Interim Rule, to represent the universe of responses
to each of those (Notice and Interim Rule) respectively.100 We devel-
100. This approach yields an unbiased sample and unbiased sub-samples. However, because
the separate sub-samples had different probabilities of selection (i.e., sampling fractions), the
data must be weighted to yield accurate estimates of population distributions. The figures and
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oped and implemented a protocol for coding all of the responses,
which allowed us to determine the proportion of commentators who
expressed various views on compensation, loss, and damage
assessment.
Our initial analysis indicated that the distribution of comments sub-
mitted by those who identified themselves as victims' survivors was
quite different from the distribution of comments submitted -by gen-
eral members of the public and others. Because unidentified mem-
bers of the general public, rather than those more closely connected to
the attacks, submitted most of the comments, our first and second
stage samples yielded a relatively small number of the latter. There-
fore, in a final stage of data collection, we drew an additional sample
of comments submitted by people who identified themselves as vic-
tims' survivors using a text search string to identify and select these
comments from the VCF website. In all, we selected 263 comments
by victims' survivors, all of which were submitted in response to the
Interim Rule.101 We coded these comments using the same protocol
that we had applied to the randomly sampled comments, but added
some other variables to the protocol to permit additional analyses.
Below, I report our findings.
2. Who Wrote to the Fund
About half of all comments came from the general public: individu-
als with no personal connection to the events of September 11th and
no self-declared eligibility for compensation. That so many people
without a direct personal interest in the program would bother to
write and submit comments may seem surprising, but other analysts
have found similar patterns in public comments on administrative
rules102 (see Figure 1).
tables that follow present these weighted data. Because measures of statistical significance are
sensitive to sample size and applying weights has the effect of increasing sample size, Chi-square
tests were performed on the unweighted data.
101. We identified and coded the final set of comments in Summer 2003. Because the method
of selecting these comments differed from the method used in the earlier phases, we could not
combine these comments with the survivors' comments sampled in those phases. Technically,
the sample selection method used for these comments was purposive rather than random; how-
ever, we have no reason to believe that the results would differ significantly for a strictly random
sample.
102. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Public Engagement in the Administrative
State, at 28-30 (2003) (unpublished draft article on file with author). Cuellar finds that the num-
bers of comments submitted in response to rule-making varies dramatically from as many as
700,000 responding to FDA's proposed regulations on advertising cigarettes to minors to a few
hundred in response to more specialized financial regulations. But even in response to more
specialized rule-making, it is not uncommon to find that a majority of comments are submitted
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FIGURE 1
Almost as many of the comments were submitted by form letters,
which resulted from organized advocacy campaigns undertaken by
certain groups. The majority of form letters in our sample were from
groups protesting feared unequal treatment of partners of gay and les-
bian victims of the attacks, many of which were submitted as a result
of a campaign by Amnesty International. We also identified letters
from other groups favoring equal treatment of gays and lesbians, from
groups concerned about how low-wage workers would be treated, and
from national advocacy groups for crime victims, as well as from un-
identified groups opposing equal treatment of gay and lesbian vic-
tims. 10 3 The proportion of form letters was highest among responses
to the Initial Notice. 104
When we exclude form letters from the distribution, we still find
that comments submitted by members of the general public
predominate. Members of the general public submitted about 80% of
the individual comments; victims' survivors submitted about 14%.
Sympathetic firefighters, police, and other safety personnel submitted
a small fraction of the comments; elected officials and representatives
of interest groups submitted another small fraction (see Figure 2).
103. We identified as "form letters" all those comments that replicated verbatim or near to
that the words of other comments. We infer that all such comments result from advocacy cam-
paigns by membership organizations. However, not all commentators identified such organiza-
tions as the source of their submissions.
104. Seventy percent of the responses to the initial notice that we sampled were form letters,
whereas 52% of responses to the interim rule were form letters, a statistically significant differ-
ence. (Chi-square = 296, p < .001) We found a negligible number of form letters among com-
ments on the Final Rule.
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Members of the general public were most likely to respond to the Ini-
tial Notice (42%) and the Final Rule (36%). Survivors' victims were
most likely to respond to the Initial Notice (36%) and to the Interim
Rule (62%), perhaps suggesting that their comments were more likely
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FIGURE 2
3. Calls for Fairness and Justice
Those who lost loved ones in the terrorist attacks and those who
held themselves out as protectors of victims' interests were substan-
tially more likely than members of the general public to frame their
comments in terms of "justice" or "fairness" (see Figure 3).106 Those
who responded to the Initial Notice were more likely to write about
fairness concerns than those who responded in later waves (34% of
the former, compared to about 20% of the latter). 10 7
Form letter writers were more likely to frame their comments in
terms of "justice" or "fairness" when commenting on the Initial No-
tice than when commenting on the Interim Rule (45%, compared to
5%).108 Those who identified themselves as relatives or partners of
victims were also more likely to frame their comments in terms of
105. Chi-square = 72.38, p < .001.
106. Chi-square = 12.807, p < .05. Of course, a reader of these comments might interpret
many comments as raising justice or fairness concerns. With this variable, we sought to distin-
guish those commentators who themselves used fairness or justice language to frame their
concerns.
107. Chi-square = 14.35, p < .001.
108. Chi-square = 35.965, p < .001.
[Vol. 53:417











Source: Weighted sample of all comments
FIGURE 3
"justice" or "fairness" when commenting on the Initial Notice, than
when commenting on the Interim Rule (50%, compared to 37%), but
these differences were not statistically significant. 10 9 (Recall that
more of those in our sample commented on the latter rather than the
former.) 1 ° Only one fifth of the members of the general public
framed their comments in terms of "justice" or "fairness," regardless
of the stage of the process at which they responded.
4. Views on Eligibility
The comments submitted to the Fund echoed the public debate
over who should be compensated by the Fund. There were two
dimensions to this debate, one regarding who among the victims' sur-
vivors-gay partners, first wives, fianc~s, fetuses, illegal aliens, or
others-should receive compensation,111 and the other regarding
whether any of the September 11th victims deserved the special com-
pensation offered them by the federal government. Three quarters of
the comments discussed whether one or more types of people should
be included or excluded from the compensation program. About two
thirds of those who addressed this issue argued for the inclusion of
one or more groups, while one third argued for exclusion. (The cod-
ing scheme permitted both inclusive and exclusive remarks.) In con-
109. Chi-square = 1.866, p > .10.
110. Among those in our special victims' survivor sample, 46% framed their arguments in
terms of "justice" or "fairness."
111. In addition, some commentators discussed whether businesses harmed by the attacks and
their aftermath should receive compensation. Businesses are not eligible to receive compensa-
tion from the VCF.
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trast, only 5% of the comments discussed the appropriateness of
compensating September 11th victims without similarly compensating
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, the previous bombing of the
World Trade Center, or the victims of military conflicts. Among the
small fraction of commentators who compared September 11th to
other events, most argued that the September 11th victims should be
denied compensation, rather than that similar compensation should be
afforded others.
As shown in Figure 4, the form-letter writers accounted for a sub-
stantial fraction of the comments on inclusion and exclusion (see Fig-
ure 4). The victims' survivors were more likely to discuss how much
they should get than whether others should be eligible as well. Al-
though many commentators framed comments on inclusiveness and
exclusiveness in fairness terms, there was no systematic relationship
between calls for "fairness" and discussions of eligibility.
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5. Perspectives on Distributive Justice
Whether or not they said their assertions about what the Fund
should do were related to concerns about "justice" or "fairness,"
many of the commentators adopted one or more of the fairness per-
spectives that theorists have prescribed and empirical social psycholo-
gists have observed. Using the language of equity, some argued that
the Fund should ensure that those who gave the most to save others
would be most generously compensated. Others wrote about the need
for the rules to ensure that families of victims whose economic contri-
butions prior to death had been deemed most valuable by the market-
place would be compensated proportionately by the Fund. Using the
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language of equality, some argued that the Fund should treat all of the
victims' survivors similarly, without regard to whether the survivors
were spouses or children recognized as legitimate heirs under law.
Others argued that rich and poor alike should receive the same com-
pensation, as they had all suffered equally from the same event. And
some argued that the Special Master should develop rules that were
sensitive to the economic needs of the victims' survivors, without re-
gard to difference in economic or other contributions.' 12
As Figure 5 illustrates, the different commentator groups differed
substantially in their preferences for different definitions of distribu-
tive justice (see Figure 5). One third of form letter writers, many of
whose comments pertained to the ability of gay partners of victims to
obtain compensation, framed their arguments in terms of equality, as
compared to 12% of victims' survivors and 5% of the general public.
More than a third of the victims' survivors, on the other hand, as-
serted that equity required that they receive more than less meritori-
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FIGURE 5
112. In the main coding process, we did not attempt to identify distributive justice concerns
pertaining to the allocation of compensation within families (or other sets of individuals with
intimate ties to the victim). After being alerted to this issue, we added a variable to the coding
protocol that we applied to our supplemental sample of victims' survivors. Only 5% of this latter
sample discussed distributive justice within family or other intimate groupings. One illustrative
comment argued that all family members-parents and siblings, as well as the dependent spouse
and children-deserved "equal recognition under the law for the loss that we all equally have."
Others worried that family members would deprive them of legitimate compensation: "What
happens if the victim is my mother and I am not on good terms with my stepfather? ... Is there
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FIGURE 6
letter writers made similar arguments. Interest group representatives
were most likely to make equality arguments. 113
Although they frequently framed distributive justice arguments in
terms of equity, victims' survivors were even more likely to argue for
incorporating tort principles in the VCF's rules (see Figure 6). Survi-
vors also were more likely than other groups to frame arguments in
terms of tort principles; the only other group that mentioned tort prin-
ciples at all frequently were the politicians and interest group repre-
sentatives who wrote to the Special Master.114 Survivors' penchant
for tort arguments predated the publication of the Interim Rules; 58%
of those who commented on the Initial Notice and 46% of those who
commented on the Interim Rules made tort-based arguments. (Be-
cause our sample of victims' survivors is quite small, these differences
are not statistically significant. Our special sample of victims' survi-
vors was drawn solely from responses to the Interim Rule.)
That the debate over the VCF was framed substantially by tort prin-
ciples was vividly illustrated by the frequency with which commenta-
tors discussed the collateral source rule. Although it seems unlikely
that most Americans were aware of the rule before controversy over
its application to the Fund erupted, 30% of all those who wrote to the
Special Master mentioned the rule. Two thirds of victims' survivors
wrote about the rule, and it was mentioned as well in a substantial
113. The group differences for all three variables are statistically significant. For need, Chi-
square = 10.729, p < .05; for equity, Chi-square 85.613, p < .001; for equality, Chi-square =
54.408, p < .001.
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FIGURE 8
fraction of other letters (see Figure 7).115 Those whose comments
largely reflected a preference for equity principles of distributive jus-
tice were significantly more likely than others to voice opinions on the
collateral source offset rule (see Figure 8). 116
An examination of the frequency of different fairness perspec-
tives-equity, equality, need, and tort-among comments that made
115. Differences across groups were statistically significant. Chi-square = 155.98, p < .001.
116. Chi-square = 40.11, p < .001. Opinion was overwhelmingly against the collateral offset
provisions, as evidenced by the form letters urging elimination of the provision. But some had
more nuanced views, urging offsetting some but not all collateral sources. Among those who
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FIGURE 9
explicit references to "fairness" and "justice" and those that did not
suggests how strongly tort principles came to frame the debate over
how to distribute the Fund's compensation dollars (see Figure 9). Of
all of the fairness perspectives we recorded, inclusiveness-arguing
for expanded eligibility for VCF compensation-was the most popu-
lar. But as time passed, it was the collateral source offset specifically
and tort notions more generally-and the equitable principles that
tort seemed best to represent-that came to stand for principles of
fairness and justice.
6. Procedural Justice
Critics of the tort system's handling of mass claims often point to
the absence of individualized due process, and some lawyers had ex-
pressed concern about the appointment of Kenneth Feinberg as Spe-
cial Master because of his history of designing mass tort claims
resolution programs that relied on "grids" and other administrative
devices. But less than 5% of the comments submitted to the Special
Master-about half from victims' survivors-pertained to procedural
issues. Victims' survivors (and some lawyer members of the public)
objected to asking claimants to commit themselves to the administra-
tive compensation process before knowing with certainty how much
they would receive from the Fund; a few others expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the limited opportunity for hearing and the lack of an ap-
peals process.
Survivor critics of the administrative process were seemingly more
concerned about the formulae that the Special Master adopted for de-
termining damages than about any lack of opportunity for process it-
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self. One woman who identified herself as the fianc6e of someone
killed in the World Trade Center pleaded for more rules to govern the
distribution of compensation within victims' families.117 Another
woman who lost her husband in the attacks wrote:
In a wide variety of air crash and terrorism cases, judges, juries and
mediators commonly have provided non-economic damage awards
well into the seven-figure range. My children have to go through the
rest of their life without the man that was helping to shape them
into productive, honest citizens of this country. He's no longer here
to laugh and play with them, swim and vacation with them, be their
soccer and softball coach. Is their pain only worth $50,000?118
The lack of attention to process is striking given the frequency with
which commentators framed their other concerns about the VCF in
terms of tort principles; it also suggests that those who argued for ap-
plication of tort principles to the VCF were motivated more by a de-
sire to maximize financial outcomes than by a desire for a "day in
court."
7. Corrective Justice
Less than 10% of the victims' survivors submitted comments dis-
cussing the government's, airlines', or other private entities' (e.g., the
Port Authority) responsibility for the September 11th attacks or their
consequences. Some argued that the negligence of some or all of
these entities justified higher compensatory damages or punitive dam-
ages. Others seemingly simply wanted to put their views of others'
culpability for their losses on the record. Only a few explicitly linked
such concerns to a desire to litigate (see Figure 10).
8. Acknowledgment of Worth
Only 5% of the victims' survivors' comments discussed the morality
of assigning a dollar value to individual life-one called it "inhu-
mane"-or the social meaning of setting a particular dollar value on
their loved one's life. Some wrote that the value set on their child's,
117. Comment N002420, Jan. 19, 2002 ("In all fairness if the fiancees/domestic partner are
going to be denied the opportunity to apply for the Victims Compensation Fund on our own, it
should be determined how the settlement should be divided when there is a fiancee/domestic
partner involved. It is very difficult to discuss these financial matters with the family and it might
be helpful if there are distribution regulations set to protect people in these situations.").
118. N002489, Jan. 17, 2002. Claimants' focus on substantive rules rather than process is con-
sistent with social psychological studies suggesting people may use procedural justice assess-
ments as a "heuristic" for assessing fairness of dispute resolution processes when they have no
benchmarks to assess outcome fairness. See Lind, supra note 36. The ability for claimants to
compare outcomes across perceived like situations distinguished the VCF from ordinary tort
litigation.
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parent's, or spouse's life was an "insult" to his or her "memory," "life-
time's worth," or "heroic deeds."1 19 Conversely, one argued that
more money would "dignify the value of [his] brother's pain and suf-
fering. ' 120 Others saw the compensation that they could expect under
the VCF's rules as "trivializing" their own loss and anguish or "mak-
ing light" of their own memories. One took issue with the notion that
under the rules "Bill Gates is worth more than 180,000 human be-
ings," 121 another with the idea that "[his] mother's life is not worth the
same as the next person's. 1 22 One argued that "surely" his brother's
salary "does not indicate the value of his life,"1 23 another that "one
119. See e.g., comment N000436, Dec. 24, 2001 ("The mere pittance that the government
thinks my mother's life is worth is an insult to our family and should be to all of the caring and
thoughtful Americans who emptied their pockets to help the victims' families."), N002288, Jan.
22, 2002 ("no amount of money could ever compensate for the loss of my son, but do not insult
his memory and all his heroic deeds by offering such low token amounts for his lifetime's worth
..."), [N]002171, Jan. 21, 2002 ("It seems impossible to put a money value on the life of a child
that you have given birth to, raised, loved, encouraged and supported to do and given his best in
life. did just that and he gave his best. He gave himself. Please don't insult his memory.")
120. N000716, Dec. 22, 2002 ("Or at least dignify the value of my Brother's pain and suffering
to a respectable figure.")
121. N001401, Jan. 7, 2002 ("The reason there are such gross disparities in the projected settle-
ments is that the proposed regulations include so little compensation for loss of human life! It is
instructive to realize that Bill Gates is worth more than 180 thousand human beings using the
Master's logic.").
122. N001349, Jan. 4, 2002 ("How can anyone say that my mother's life is not worth the same
as the next person's?")
123. N1497, Jan. 10, 2002 ("My brother died with a $1.05 in his wallet, surely that does not
indicate the value of his life, neither does his 36K salary.").
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billion dollars" could not "fix" the loss of his father."24 A mother who
lost her daughter in the attacks saw the task before the Special Master
as impossible:
How can anyone say how much someone's pain is worth and whose
pain is greater? ... I attended the meeting [apparently explaining
the compensation rules] .. .but I left in disgust. I can't help but
believe that her life is worth less because she didn't make a great
salary .... [She] was my strength, she picked me up when I was
down .... Had you known [her daughter], you would have liked her
from the start .... As I see it, and have felt from the beginning, my
daughter is not important [in the eyes of the program because] she
had no husband, children nor was she a policeman nor fireman...
[but] she does have a family that loves her and needs her ... the
pain is the worst pain imaginable and only those that go through it
would know, so again please tell me how you can tell me what my
pain is worth? 125
Some may interpret these more expressive comments simply as in-
strumental strategies for framing claims for more money-indeed,
most are offered as rationales for changing the Fund's rules so as to
award more money to the commentator. But the frequent compara-
tive judgments-to Bill Gates, others' mothers' and just "other peo-
ple" writ large-seem also to display a discomfort with the difference
in values placed on people's lives that is not often expressed in con-
temporary American society. By assigning a value to each survivor's
loss-a task assigned him by the Act-the Special Master became the
message for society's assessment of each victim. The notion that all
members of the society are equal was revealed as a social fiction, and
the lesser value of some was revealed for all to see.
IV. RETHINKING TORT DAMAGES FOR NONECONOMIC Loss
"Money talks." Money is a medium of exchange for labor and
products. But it is also a medium for conveying social meaning. Vol-
untary monetary transfers can demonstrate individuals' acceptance of
responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, sympathy for those
less fortunate than they, solidarity with members of their community
who have suffered misfortune, or obligation to family members or
others. Socially mandated transfers-in the form of fines, civil dam-
ages, alimony, child support, social security payments, or taxes-ex-
press group norms. Norms establishing the amount of money that
should be paid in these different circumstances also convey meaning
124. N000209, Dec. 21, 2001 ("My family will be missing most importantly my father one
billion dollars can't fix that."), comment N000139, Dec. 20, 2001.
125. N000139, Dec. 20, 2001.
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about how large an obligation one set of people has to another and
about how much recipients deserve from these others. Whenever
money changes hands, it carries with it multiple messages about per-
sonal and social relationships and about personal and social worth.
But these messages are so embedded in the culture that many people
rarely stop to consider them.
Tort law foregrounds questions of monetary worth. However, con-
temporary tort doctrine, shaped primarily by economic theory, dis-
counts the social meaning of tort damages. The goals of risk-
spreading and deterrence demand a proper accounting of economic
losses resulting from wrongful injury and death not an articulation of
contextualized social obligations and personal worth. Tort plaintiffs'
reactions to their litigation experiences and litigation outcomes sug-
gest that they have more diverse goals. They want money to cover
their losses, but they also want defendants to accept responsibility.
They want defendants to change their practices. In instances of
wrongful death, they want the community to recognize the enormity
of their own personal loss and the value of the person who has died.
It is the money that tort plaintiffs are after when they sue-but it's not
just the money.
Viewed from an expressive social normative perspective, assigning
the task of valuing loss and life to a jury constituted of members of the
community makes sense. But then holding the jury's behavior to
economists' assessments of the monetary value of nonmarket activity
and of the value of life, ignoring how those assessments may differ
from the community's, does not.
Realizing the social value of loss estimation and life valuation re-
quires not just community participation but also public process. As
tort litigation retreats further and further from the courthouse and
from public view, the social meaning of tort damages is harder for
all-plaintiffs, defendants, and the public-to discern. Only rarely
does the contemporary tort system provide a public stage for assigning
responsibility and valuing loss and life. In practice, the tort system has
become a privatized fault-based administrative scheme that relies on
experts to calculate the economic costs of injury and death, adjust this
calculation to reflect various legal factors and add an amount for
"pain and suffering" that is determined by a formula. Perhaps it is not
surprising that in the increasingly rare circumstances in which juries
determine damages, their decisions-particularly with regard to
noneconomic damages-surprise the experts.
With the publication of rules for determining compensation for vic-
tims of the September 11th attacks, the social meaning of loss and life
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in contemporary American life assumed center stage. Because Con-
gress mandated a tort-based compensation scheme, rather than a
need-based scheme or a program that provided equal compensation
for all eligible victims, the Special Master was required to adopt a
compensation scheme that reflected the vastly different market values
of the September 11th victims. In sharp contrast to the private negoti-
ations of conventional tort litigation, because the September 11th pro-
gram was publicly mandated, the compensation rules and the
consequences of the rules for the victims' families, all of whom had
suffered the same personal loss, were displayed for all to see.
The responses to the publication of the VCF rules suggest there is
widespread support for the underlying "make whole" principle of tort
damages. Ironically, the government's plan to preclude tort litiga-
tion-albeit in circumstances in which many experts believed tort
damages would be difficult to obtain-called forth an outpouring of
support for tort's approach to assessing loss. Even in the context of
catastrophic injury, when the nation's sense of community seemed to
be at its height-and psychological research suggests equality- and
need-based compensation would attract strong support-equitable
principles of distributive justice trumped principles of equality and
need. Special Master Feinberg's efforts to introduce a modicum of
equality into the September 11th compensation scheme by distribut-
ing equal amounts of pain and suffering damages to victims' survivors
received little support from the general public-and virtually none
from the survivors themselves. Those who wrote to the Fund and who
spoke to the media were united in their belief that they deserved com-
pensation amounts that reflected their precatastrophe economic status
(and potential to rise higher in the future), without regard to how this
might advantage them compared to other victims. Widespread sup-
port for paying tort-like damages to the September 11th victims, un-
derscored by opposition to the collateral source offsets mandated by
Congress but not required in tort litigation in many jurisdictions, indi-
cates the difficult challenge that faces those who advocate substituting
administrative compensation programs for tort in circumstances rang-
ing from automobile accidents to occupational exposure to asbestos.
The debate over the VCF's compensation rules also highlights the
difficulty faced by those who advocate adopting "need" as the princi-
ple for allocating government-subsidized compensation, in a society
accustomed to vast disparities in life-styles. Americans apparently
have little difficulty limiting support for those in need whom they
deem nonmeritorious, such as welfare mothers. But those who lost
loved ones in the September 11th attacks were universally viewed as
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meriting support (although not necessarily to the exclusion of, or in
preference to, others). And these victims had highly subjective views
of "need." What looked like extravagant lifestyles to lower-income
commentators on the VCF rules were perceived by higher-income vic-
tims as the very "needs" that merited compensation from the Fund.
To those who might question the fairness of providing them with so
much, while others would be provided with much less, these more af-
fluent victims simply responded that the latter "needed" less to sus-
tain their own life styles. At least initially, the public seemed
sympathetic with these. victims' perspectives. 126
In sum, tort principles of compensation, with their indifference to
equality and only half-hearted attention to need, seem well-positioned
to support Americans' apparent preference for the economic inequal-
ity that many view as the product of meritocratic norms. But the Sep-
tember 11th victims' survivors anguish about placing a value on their
loved ones' lives strikes a chord that is at odds with this general pref-
erence, one that is heard as well in more ordinary tort plaintiffs' reac-
tions to the tort litigation process. However they may feel about
disparities in wealth in American society, and tort principles generally,
when victims are forced to confront the dollar value placed on their
own loved ones' lives, they recoil in dismay. How can this life-and
my pain-they ask, be worth so little? How can they be worth less than
others' lives and pain?
For many people, the mere act of translating human life to money is
morally reprehensible. But few victims are ready, therefore, to turn
away money. The September 11th victims' survivors' comments sug-
gest that they looked to what others were getting as a measure of the
justness of their own compensation. Those who under the VCF rules
would obtain the most compensation saw this outcome as only just.
But those who would achieve less felt morally affronted, unwilling to
accept the notion that the lives of their loved ones were worth less
than those of other victims-or less than that of others in society, such
as Bill Gates.
What do the debate and commentary on compensating victims of
the September 11th attacks teach us about damages in ordinary tort
litigation? Because there has been so little research on how tort plain-
tiffs view damages, and because jury behavior research until recently
did not focus on damage calculations, we do not know how concerns
126. As Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Com-
pensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289 (2003), suggests in her contribution to this Symposium, over
time the public may have changed its views of survivors' merit, and their willingness to subsidize
large compensation payments.
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about moral worth might affect ordinary tort plaintiffs' views or juror
decision-making. Widespread reporting of high salaries, bonuses, and
other economic rewards paid to executives, athletes, movie-stars, and
other celebrities may affect how plaintiffs and jurors view the value of
life. If CEOs are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, plaintiffs and
jurors may ask, why is this father or this mother or this child not worth
the same, morally speaking? Whereas large punitive damage awards
may reflect a desire on the part of some jurors to "send the defendant
a message," large awards for noneconomic damages may occur in con-
texts in which jurors want to make a statement about the moral value
of the lives of others like themselves. Statutory curbs on
noneconomic damages that seek to stifle such desires, if and where
such desires exist, strike at the central moral function of jury decision-
making. The controversy over the VCF's rules highlights the ongoing
social importance of this function.
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